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The common theme of these Articles is institutional comparison. Profes-
sors Carruthers and Halliday compare the politics of bankruptcy legislation in
the United States in 1978 and in England in 1986. Professor Block-Lieb,
here, and in her other work, compares the costs of political failure with the
costs of market failure, maintaining a particular focus on the federal system.,
My assignment is to compare federal bankruptcy lawmaking with the state
uniform law process. The United States law of debtors and creditors, like
most United States commercial law, is characterized by a jurisdictional split
between uniform state law, nonuniform state law and federal law.2 Bank-
ruptcy law operates against the background of state lien law contained in
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and the state law of real
*Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; J.D. 1987 University of Chicago; B-A. 1983 Yale
College. I would like to thank Bob Lawless for inviting me to participate in the 2000 Annual Meeting of
the DebtorCreditor Section of the American Association of Law Schools where this paper was originally
presented. I would also like to thank Dean Nancy Rapoport, Paul Schwartz and Susan Block-Lieb for
helpful comments on an earlier draft, and Neil Cohen and Paul Shupack for helpful insights into the Article
9 revision process. Finally, I would like to thank Tally Wiener for essential and extraordinary research
assistance, without which it would have been impossible to complete this article. Mistakes are, of course,
mine alone.
1See Susan Block-Lieb, Congress' Temptation to Defect: A Political and Economic Theory of Legislative
Resolutions to Financial Common Pool Problems, 9 Aiuz. L. REv. 80 (1997); Susan Block-Lieb, The Logic
and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).21n addition to the division between federal bankruptcy law and the state law of debt collection,
Articles 3, 4, and 4a of the Uniform Commercial Code govern the payment system on the state law side,
see U.C.C. § 3-102 (1999) and cmt.1; U.C.C. § 4-101 cmt.3 (1990), while Federal laws governing the
payment system include the Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (1999), Regula-
tion CC, 12 C.F.R. § 229 (1999), and the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-
1693r, 1693(b) (1999) (which "provide[s] a basic framework establishing the rights, liabilities, and respon-
sibilities of participants in electronic fund transfer systems" with the "primary objective of... provi[ding]
individual consumer rights"), and the regulations issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System to implement EFTA, 12 C.F.R. § 229.1(a) (1999). See also Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667(e) (1999), and Reg Z, 12 C.F.R. 226 (1999). A similar split exists in the area of
securities law where Article 8 of the UCC shares the field with the federal Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77a (1999) (1933 Act), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1999) (1934
Act).
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estate mortgages. State lien law exists, to a large extent (Lopez3 notwith-
standing), by federal sufferance.4 Where, as a policy matter, should the juris-
dictional line be drawn?
In seeking to answer that question, my focus will not be on substantive
law but on the relative strengths and weaknesses of the respective lawmaking
processes. In order to facilitate a focus on political institutions, I will assume
market failure.5 This assumption is at least plausible in the bankruptcy con-
text. Markets are pretty good at allocating resources, but markets sometimes
fail. In the business bankruptcy area, insolvency of an entity with widely
disbursed creditors creates a collective action problem that often leads to
inefficient liquidations.6 On the consumer bankruptcy side the market imper-
fection is much simpler. A significant number of American citizens seem to
think that it makes rational economic sense to use a credit card with an
interest rate of twenty percent, to borrow money to play games of chance
where the house is guaranteed to win.7 Worse yet, the consumer credit in-
dustry seems to think that it makes rational economic sense to provide the
credit cards that make such behavior possible.8
3United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995) (holding that Congress exceeded its regulatory
power under the Commerce Clause in enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 because posses-
sion of a gun in a school zone is not an activity that "substantially affects interstate commerce").
4See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (holding that public accom-
modations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1954 were valid under the Commerce Clause because "the
power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate local incidents
thereof, including local activities in both the States of origin and destination, which might have a substan-
tial and harmful effect upon that commerce").
5Economists often assume market perfection. I majored in political science and, therefore, feel justified
in assuming market imperfection.
6See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Abso-
lute Priority Rule, 55 U. Ci. L. REv. 738, 749-50 (1988) ("Because bankruptcy is a collective proceeding,
the bankruptcy judge has the power in some cases to bind nonconsenting parties. Without such a power,
there would be no way to overcome the collective action problem that is the justification for bankruptcy
in the first instance."); Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 173,
183-84 (1987). See also THoMAs H. JACKSON, THE LoGic AND Lnn-rs oF BANKRuwircv LAW 7-19
(1986).
7See Internet Games of Chance: The Growth of Gambling in Cyberspace is 'Exploding,' which Points
Up the Need for Creative Regulation, SAN FRANcisco ExAMNEnR, Jan. 18, 2000, available in 2000 WL
6158088 ('In the next two years, [casino] revenues [from Internet gambling] are expected to nearly triple
from $1.2 billion last year to $3 billion by 2002.... An estimated 14.5 million people have gambled on
line. Most of them were Americans using credit cards."). SMR Research Corp. of Hackettstown, N.J.
studied the frequency of bankruptcies in counties with legalized casino gambling.
SMR examined 1996 bankruptcies and found that the filing rate in 2,844 counties with no casinos was
3.96 per thousand. In 298 counties with legalized gambling within their borders, the rate was 4.67 per
thousand. And 23 counties with five or more casinos had a bankruptcy rate of 5.33 per thousand.
"We don't actually have a problem with the (gambling) industry, but the odds favor the house, said
Stu Feldstein of SMR Research. "Outside the gambling industry itself, does anyone really think that
increased gambling helps consumers' bill-paying ability more than it hurts." Joyce Smith, When Luck Runs
Out, KANSAS CIrY STAR, Jan. 9, 2000, available in 2000 WL 7719859.
'See Douglas Holt, Gaming Chief Urges Session on Problem Gambling: Casino Loans, ATMs Among
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If these market imperfections need to be corrected-that is, the benefits
of correction exceed its costs-which is the best political institution to do
this?
I don't write on a completely blank slate. I have written two previous
articles that bear on the topic, one focusing on the public choice of bank
insolvency law,9 and the second examining the Article 9 revision.10 To over-
simplify the conclusions of those two prior pieces, (1) the federal lawmaking
process is better at making most distributive choices than the uniform and
nonuniform state lawmaking processes;" and (2) early solicitation of partici-
pation by interested groups in the federal lawmaking process may improve
the results of federal lawmaking.' 2
A few years ago, bankruptcy reform looked like an excellent opportunity
to prove up these two theories. The National Bankruptcy Review Commis-
sion was gathering public input and making recommendations, seeking, as the
report of the Commission later stated, "balance."' 3 The Commission itself
contained a broadly representative mix of members and advisers, from the
Issues on Table, CHL Tm., Jan. 20,2000, available in 2000 WL 3628397 QGambling critics recently have
focused on the easy availability of cash as a contributor to compulsive gambling:).
9Edward J. Janger, The FDIC's Fraudulent Conveyance Power Under the Crime Control Act of 1990:
Bank Insolvency Law and the Politics of the Iron Triangle, 28 CoNN. L. REv. 67 (1995) [hereinafter Janger,
Iron Triangle].
'
0 Edward J. janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture, and the
Race to the Bottom, 83 IowA L. REv 569 (1998) [hereinafter Janger, Article 9 Revision].
"See id. at 593. Other scholars have noted the difficulty that the uniform law process faces in address-
ing distributive questions. Most recently, Linda Rusch has detailed the difficulties faced by the drafting
committee for Revised Article 2 in addressing the concerns of consumer groups and manufacturers. Linda
J. Rusch, A History and Perspective of Revised Article 2: The Never Ending Saga of a Search For Balance,
52 SMU L. Rev. 1683 (1999). See also, James J. White, Comments at 1997 AALS Annual Meeting
Consumer Protection and the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 219,222 (1997) (arguing that
the lack of consensus regarding the rules contained in the Article 9 (and Article 2) revisions creates a
significant risk that the proposed revisions will not achieve uniform adoption); William J. Woodward, Jr,
The Realist and Secured Credit: Grant Gilmore, Common-Law Courts, and the Article 9 Reform Process,
82 CORNELL L. REv. 1511, 1522 (1997) ('Enactibility has confined the work product of the UCC revi-
sion process, and usually counsels restraint in moving too far from the perceived status quo. Enactibility
operates as the great leveling agent in the reform process; the need for enactibility means that nothing too
controversial can be included in the UCC or some states will balk and thereby defeat the uniformity that
is so central to the validity of this unusual legislative process" (citation omitted)). See also Homer Kripke,
The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code, U. ILL. L. Rev. 321, 327 (1962)
(Not only were conservative tendencies present during the drafting; they were visible on the horizon at
the legislative stage. The draftsmen and the members of the sponsor organizations knew that to draft a
dead-letter bill would accomplish nothing. The Code had to be enacted... .).
"
2See Janger, Iron Triangle, supra note 9, at 105 n.128.
"
3See NATIoNAL B ANc. Ray. Comi'XN FiNAL REPORT, B aNKRupTcY: THE NEXr Twmerr YEARS,
iii (October 20, 1997) [hereinafter NBRC REPORT]. According to the preface to the NBRC Ra,'oRm
"The recommendations [of the Commission] are as diverse as the bankruptcy system itself, but they have
been designed with a common theme: to improve the integrity, the accountability and the efficiency of that
system. Above all else, the recommendations address the need to maintain-and, in some instances, to
restore-balance. A bankruptcy system that does not balance the interests of creditors and the interests
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reporter, Professor Elizabeth Warren, to Judge Edith Jones.14 Numerous pub-
lic hearings were planned, and ultimately held.'5
Well theory isn't everything, or more to the point, "better" can still leave
us a very long way from perfect. The Commission Report has proven contro-
versial, and oddly, did not form the basis for much of what subsequently
materialized as the Bankruptcy Reform Acts before Congress in 1998, 1999
and 2000.16 Indeed, as bankruptcy reform unfolded, I began to believe that it
had been created for the sole purpose of giving a black eye to my scholarly
project. My concern grew as conversations at conferences began to run like
this: "I really liked your uniform law piece - except for that ridiculous (posi-
tive) stuff you said about federal lawmaking process." Here, I take some time
to reflect more carefully upon and to perhaps rehabilitate the federal lawmak-
ing process (if not the Bankruptcy Reform Act).' 7
Broadly speaking, my thesis is that the relative strengths and weaknesses
of the federal and uniform state lawmaking processes can be traced to the
differences between government by consensus and government by minimum-
winning-coalition and the resulting capacity/incapacity of the institution to
assimilate conflict.' 8 As we proceed, however, it is crucial to pay close atten-
tion to the baseline, and to recall Winston Churchill's famous observation
that "Democracy is the worst form of government except all [the others]."' 9
The baseline here is not perfection, but the various alternative forms of
rulemaking: federal law, state law, uniform state law, judicial rulemaking, and
the old standby, unregulated markets. Also, it is important to recognize that
the most socially useful aspect of an institution may not be its most
of debtors will have neither their confidence nor, of even greater importance, the confidence of the Ameri-
can people." Id.
"4Compare Judge Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It's Time for Means-Testing, 1999 B.Y.U. L.
Rav. 177, 180 (1999) [hereinafter Jones & Zywicki, Means-Testing] (The recent rise in personal bank-
ruptcies has been significantly influenced by a decline in the personal shame and social stigma traditionally
accompanying bankruptcy, and by changes in the law and legal practice that have facilitated filing bank-
ruptcy."), with Elizabeth Warren, The Bankruptcy Crisis, 73 INqD. LJ. 1079, 1101 (1998) ('Better health
insurance coverage, limits on credit solicitations, and better consumer credit disclosures might help more
families use credit wisely, which would help them survive the financial pitfalls many will encounter....
[A] decline in [bankruptcy filing] rates is good only if it is a sign that fewer families are failing").
'sSee NBRC REPORT, supra note 13, at ix.
16H.R. 833, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 625, 106th Cong. (1999). See infra note 17 for dates of passage of
these bills.
'TThis article was originally presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association of Law
Schools on January 7, 2000. S. 625 passed the Senate on February 2, 2000 by a vote of 83-14. H.TL 833
passed the house by a vote of 313-108 on May 5, 1999. As of this writing, the bill is in conference, as the
two houses seek to resolve the differences between the bills.
"SSee William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for
Statutory Interpretation, 75 VA. L. REv. 275, 283-85 (1988).
19The exact quote is: -Democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that
have been tried from time to time." Winston Churchill, Address to the House of Commons (Nov. 11,
1947), in INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS OF QUOTATIONS 231 (1970).
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attractive.20
I. UNIFORM STATE LAW AND THE ARTICLE 9 REVISION
In my Iowa article,21 I suggested that uniform state law (in the form of
the UCC) is a wonderful institution for addressing the mechanics of commer-
cial transactions but that it is not well equipped to deal with rules that raise
distributive issues (such as, to name just two, consumer protection, or allocat-
ing the costs associated with conquering the race of diligence). To flesh out
the argument a little, I argued that there are two paradigmatic situations
where uniform state law will not work well. First, uniform state law should
not be used to promulgate rules where interest group theory22 would predict
capture of the uniform law process or of state legislatures.2 3 This is most
likely where a proposed rule is distributive and there is an asymmetric alloca-
tion of power among interested groups. The classic example in the literature
is military expenditures, where the defense industry reaps a concentrated
benefit, and we all pay a small fraction of the cost.24 Second, I argued, uni-
form state law should not be used to promulgate rules which would be likely
to be subject to a race to the bottom, if left to the nonuniform state lawmak-
ing process.25 These concerns arise where a rule creates the possibility of
either intrafirm or interstate externality. The classic example of a rule that
creates an intrafirm externality is, arguably, a poison pill that allows corpo-
rate managers to insulate themselves from the market for corporate control at
the expense of shareholders.26 The classic example of an interstate external-
ity is Delaware, a small state, which is said to benefit from the enactment of
liberal corporate enabling laws, while exporting the costs of such laws to
'Otto von Bismarck is often quoted as saying "If you like law and sausages, you should never watch
either one being made." REsPEcTFULLY QUOTED 190 (Suzy Platt ed, 1992).
2 Janger, Article 9 Revision, supra note 10.
2 What I refer to here as "interest group theory" is sometimes referred to as "public choice7 theory.
For an excellent and accessible review of the literature, see KEmNET A. SHEPsLE AND MARK S.
BONCHEK, ANALYzING PoLrrlcs: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS (1997). Here, I am
specifically referring to the insights that follow from the insight, first articulated by Mancur Olson in his
book, MANCUR OLsON, THE LOGIC OP COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965), that political participation is a
"public good" and likely to be undersupplied where the costs or benefits of a particular political action are
dispersed widely.
3See Janger, Article 9 Revision, supra note 10, at 593.
24See Janger, Iron Triangle, supra note 9, at 68-70; GORDON ADAMs, THE IRON TRANGLE 15 (1981)
(A powerful flow of people and money moves between the defense contractors, the Executive Branch
(DoD and NASA), and Congress, creating an 'iron triangle' on defense policy that excludes outsiders and
alternative perspectives.7).
2
sSee Janger, Article 9 Revision, supra note 10, at 588-91.
s6f Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competi-
tion in Corporate Law, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1435, 1462-63 (1992) [hereinafter Bebhuk, Federalism].
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other states. 27
When a uniform law implicates any of these concerns, there is reason to
believe that federal or nonuniform state legislation will produce more efficient
and more equitable rules. 28 This is because the desire for uniform adoption
creates a troublesome dynamic. Even if the uniform law process is not cap-
tured, the drafters may be forced to anticipate the capture of state legisla-
tures, and adopt the "captured7 rule. As such, even an uncaptured uniform
law process might unwittingly, or even against its will, become an instrument
of capture.29 Similarly, wherever a race to the bottom3 might cause states to
deviate from the uniform rule, the uniform law drafters, again seeking uniform
and universal adoption, will be forced to anticipate the effect of the race to
the bottom in the uniform law. 3' Thus the effect of a uniform law might be
to facilitate and, indeed, effectuate a race to the bottom.
Both of these dynamics-anticipated capture and anticipated race to the
bottom-were discernible in the Article 9 revision process. Anticipation of
capture could be observed in connection with the debate over consumer pro-
tection. A number of controversial consumer protection provisions were in-
cluded in early drafts of Revised Article 9.32 These provisions led the
representatives of the consumer credit industry to "walk out" of the discus-
sions. Ultimately, the relevant provisions were removed, in return for re-
moval of a number of provisions that were perceived as harmful to consumers.
A consumer "peace treaty" was brokered between representatives of the con-
27See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YA.E LJ. 663,
665-66 (1974) [hereinafter, Gary, Delaware].
'There is a third category of statutes for which use of the uniform lawmaking process may not be
appropriate. In some instances the existence of a race to the top will counsel against use of the uniform
law process. There, actual state competition may be preferable to anticipated state competition. See
Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL
STUD. 131, 140 (1996) (A decentralized decision-making process normally can produce more possible
solutions to a problem than could a single rulemaker."). See also F. Stephen Knippenberg & William J.
Woodward, Jr., Uniformity and Efficiency in the Uniform Commercial Code: A Partial Research Agenda,
45 Bus. LAw. 2519, 2524 (1990). In these instances, the benefits of competition must be weighed against
the benefits of uniformity. Where commercial law is involved, however, the need for uniformity is para-
mount, and the relevant choice is between uniform state law and federal law.
29See Janger, Article 9 Revision, supra note 10, at 584-88.
3 See generally Bebchuk, Federalism, supra note 26; Cary, Delaware, supra note 27, at 663; David
Charny, Competition Among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Law Rules: An American Perspective
on the "Race to the Bottom" in European Communities, 32 HAIv. INT'L LJ. 423 (1991); Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX L.
Rav. 469 (1987); Roberta Romano, Law as Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 225 (1985); Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 545
(1984).
3 Anticipation of a race to the top may be a strength of the uniform law process. On the one hand, if
the top can be identified, then its inclusion in a uniform law will encourage its uniform adoption. On the
other hand, adoption of a uniform law may prevent states from competing by locking in a suboptimal rule.
"See Janger, Article 9 Revision, supra note 10, at 612-14.
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sumer credit industry and consumer advocates. Neither of the "signatory
groups" had votes on the drafting committee, but both could make a credible
threat to oppose enactment of Revised Article 9 in the states. The substance
of the treaty was that, if the agreed changes were made to Revised Article 9,
the consumer credit industry would support and the consumer advocates
would not oppose passage of the statute in the various state legislatures.
33
A race to the bottom may also have been "anticipated" in connection
with drafting Revised Article 9's choice-of-law provisions.3 4 Initially, the
drafters rejected "state of incorporation" filing for corporate debtors, in favor
of "location of the debtor" filing, out of concern that the rule would shift
filing fees to Delaware. An empirical study conducted by Professor LoPucki
suggested that the amount of the fee shift would be only two to three million
dollars.35 This amount was viewed as tolerable, and the "state of incorpora-
tion" rule was adopted.36 Later, it was recognized that the "state of incorpo-
ration" rule might create conflicts with, or even override nonuniform local
lien law intended to govern assets within a particular jurisdiction. This led
the drafters to bifurcate the choice-of-law .provisions, such that the "law of
perfection" would be governed by the state of incorporation, and the "law
governing the effect of perfection" would be governed by the law of the juris-
diction where the collateral was located.37 Thus the drafters showed them-
selves to be aware of the "Delaware" problem in corporate law, and, while
the drafters may not have been thinking about a "race to the bottom" in
connection with the decision to bifurcate the choice of law itself, the rule
that they adopted deftly eliminates the incentive to adopt nonuniform lien
law in order to attract incorporations. 38 Similarly, the rejection of the so-
called "Warren Proposal," or anything resembling it,39 might be attributed, at
least in part, to concern that any modification of the rule of full priority for
secured credit might endanger uniform enactment.40
33See id.
='4Where the collateral is ordinary goods, old Article 9 generally followed a situs ruling requiring a
filing in the jurisdiction where the goods were located." See Julian B. McDonnell, Is Revised Article 9 a
Little Greedy.?, 104 CoM. LJ. 241, 251 & n.21 (1999) (citing U.C.C. § 9-103(b)).
3'Lynn hi LoPucki, The Article 9 Filing System: Why the Debtor's State of Incorporation Should be
the Proper Place for Article 9 Filing A Systems Analysis, 79 Ms-tN. L. REv. 577, 638-645 (1995).3 6Janger, Article 9 Revision, supra note 10, at 624.
37Revised U.C.C. § 9-301(3) (1999), and cmt. 7.
3s1 am grateful to Neil Cohen and Paul Shupack for sharing with me the reasons for the drafting
committee's bifurcation of the law of perfection and the effect of perfection under Revised U.C.C. § 9-30 1.
E-mail of Paul Shupack to Ted Janger dated February 27, 2000 (on file with author).
39Janger, Article 9 Revision, supra note 10, at 611-12, 623. See also, Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M.
Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE LJ. 857 (1996); Lynn
M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REv. 1887 (1994). But see Steven L. Schwarcz,
The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DuE L.J. 425 (1997).
4°See generally, Janger, Article 9 Revision, supra note 10.
2000)
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II. COMPARING UNIFORM AND FEDERAL LAWMAKING
Some, but not all of these concerns are eliminated if one shifts the locus of
lawmaking to the federal system. While a large literature on the power of
interest groups in Congress attests to the fact that capture remains a concern
at the federal level,41 two of the troublesome dynamics associated with uni-
form state law drafting are absent. First, anticipated capture is not a concern.
Capture need only be addressed in one place. If it can be prevented in Con-
gress, then, because federal law is self-executing, there is no concern that it
will reassert itself at the state level. Second, because of preemption, there is
no concern about a race to the bottom, either actual or anticipated, at least at
the domestic level.42 If Congress speaks, states cannot overrule federal legis-
lation. Third, the federal legislative process is more open and accessible.
There is nothing comparable to the Congressional Quarterly for meetings of
the American Law Institute or the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. Fourth, representation enhancement is possible at the
federal level through the use of federal advisory committees and other forms
of input.
These comparisons led me to conclude that for most distributive ques-
tions, and more specifically for the distributive questions raised by commer-
cial law, Congress provides a better forum than uniform (or nonuniform)
state lawmaking.43 Be careful what you ask for. The controversy surround-
ing the legislation in 1998, 1999 and 2000 is well known. While means test-
ing,4 4 in some form, may be a good idea, as might accelerated procedures for
41See JERRY L. MAsHAw, GREED, CHAOS, & GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE
PUBLIC LAW 81-105 (1997); MANCUR OLSON, JP, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).42A race to the bottom may be a problem with regard to enactments with international effect.43See Janger, Article 9 Revision, supra note 10, at 628.
44Section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in part:
After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a motion by the
United States Trustee, but not at the request or suggestion of any party in interest,
may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under this chapter whose debts are
primarily consumer debts if it finds that the granting of relief would be a substantial
abuse of the provisions of this chapter. There shall be a presumption in favor of
granting the relief requested by the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1994) (emphasis added). Means testing refers to legislation which proposes to create
a presumption of 'abuse" when an individual debtor files a chapter 7 petition if she has the ability to pay a
certain amount of unsecured debt, thereby forcing the debtor to seek relief under chapter 13. See HR.
833, 106th Cong. § 102 (1999); S. 625, 106th Cong. § 102 (1999). Circuit courts have set up various
standards for determining when ability to pay gives rise to substantial abuse of chapter 7. See, e.g., First
U.S.A. v. Lamanna (In re Lamanna), 153 F.3d, -1, 4 (1st Cir. 1998) ("Among the factors to be considered in
deciding whether a debtor is needy is his ability to repay his debts out of future earnings.... [A] court
would not be justified in concluding that a debtor is needy and worthy of discharge, where his disposable
income permits liquidation of his consumer debts with relative ease."); Kornfield v. Schwartz (In re
Kornfield), 164 F.3d 778, 784 (2d Cir. 1999) ('The record depicts debtors with substantial ... income.
Most of the present debt could have been avoided and all of it can be repaid over time. This is a paradigm
(Vol. 74
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small business bankruptcies45 or limitations on extensions of exclusivity,a 6 the
of the case that Section 707(b) was designed for[.]J"); Green v. Staples (In re Green), 934 F.2d 568, 572
(4th Cir. 1991) (The debtor's relative insolvency may raise an inference [of substantial abuse]r); In re
Krohn, 886 P.2d 123, 126 (6th Cir. 1989) (In determining whether to apply § 707(b) to an individual
debtor, then, a court should ascertain from the totality of the circumstances whether he is... 'honest...
and whether he is 'needy[.y.... Among the factors to be considered in deciding whether a debtor is needy
is his ability to repay his debts out of future earnings.). See also NBRC REPORT, supra note 13, at 270-
71. 45Section 427 of the Senate Bill provides:
Section 1121 of title 11, United States Code, is amended by striking subsection (e)
and inserting the following:
(e) In a small business case-
(1) only the debtor may file a plan until after 90 days after the date of
the order for relief, unless that period is
(A) shortened on request of a party in interest made during the 90-
day period;
(B) extended as provided by this subsection, after notice and hear-
ing; or
(C) the court, for cause, orders otherwise;
(2) the plan, and any necessary disclosure statement, shall be filed not
later than 90 days after the date of the order for relief; and
(3) the time periods specified in paragraphs (1) and (2), and the time
fixed in section 1129(e), within which the plan shall be confirmed,
may be extended only if-
(A) the debtor, after providing notice to parties in interest (includ-
ing the United States trustee), demonstrates by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that it is more likely than not that the
court will confirm a plan within a reasonable period of time;
(B) a new deadline is imposed at the time the extension is granted;
and
(C) the order extending time is signed before the existing deadline
has expired.
S. 625, 106th Cong. § 427 (1999). Bankruptcy Judge Wesley Steen has suggested that these deadlines
may prove impractically short:
The exclusivity period is shortened from 120 to 90 days. The proposed statute
would require plan confirmation in 150 days ....
The deadline for filing proofs of claim (except for governmental units) is 90 days
after the first meeting of creditors; creditors' meetings should occur 20-40 days after
the case is filed. Therefore, the deadline for claims is frequently more than 120 days
after the case is filed. Requiring the debtor to file a plan prior to the proof of claim
deadline can be very counterproductive. If a plan is filed and if notices are sent out
prior to the proof of claim deadline, all the cost of producing and mailing the plan
will be wasted if a significant claim is subsequently filed. (In addition, the court
will have wasted significant time in reviewing and in tentatively approving the
disclosure statement.) A second plan must be negotiated and filed. The court will
be required to review and to tentatively approve a second set of documents. Credi-
tors will be confused by receiving two sets of plans and disclosure statements and
two ballots.
More important, the government proof of claim deadline is 180 days after the
order for relief. Therefore, under its present terms, the statute would require that
the plan be confirmed 30 days prior to the deadline for filing government proofs of
claim .... Therefore, under the statute as presently written and proposed, it
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ham-handed way in which these proposals are implemented in the pending
bills have occasioned much criticism, and have forced me to consider aug-
menting my model.
In comparing uniform state law to federal lawmaking, I concluded that
the absence of certain characteristics of the uniform process make federal law-
making better. Bankruptcy reform has forced me to consider whether the
absence of certain characteristics of the uniform law process might make the
federal lawmaking worse, or at least different. After some thought, here are
some caveats that I would add, and a qualified defense of federal lawmaking.
Interest Group Participation. First, more interest groups play actively at
the federal level than at the state level.47 As a result, for better and for
worse, interest group participation will more obviously condition the federal
process.
Government by Minimum Winning Coalition. Second, because federal
law is self-executing (that is, doesn't have to be considered and passed in all
fifty states), a minimum winning coalition, or even a minimum veto-proof
majority will do. By contrast, consensus is required in the uniform law pro-
cess. As a result, it will not be necessary to justify each reform in terms of
greater good for all (Pareto-superiority). Instead, it will be sufficient to gar-
ner the support of fifty-one percent (or sixty-seven percent if a veto is likely)
appears that government claims could be discharged even though the deadline for
filing the claims has not passed ....
Finally, introduction of an absolute 150 day deadline creates the incentive for
some parties to engage in strategic litigation rather than good faith bargaining.
With an absolute deadline in effect, a party that is fully secured (perhaps over-
secured) might actually find it profitable to obfuscate and delay rather than negoti-
ate in good faith ....
In addition, the statute makes no provision for extension of time so that credi-
tors can file motions to appoint a trustee or for creditors to file a plan. Theoreti-
cally, a creditor could file a plan on the 91st day, but because of the requirement for
two notice periods (of 25 days each) and because of the realities of court schedules,
it is unlikely that a confirmation hearing on a creditor plan could be concluded
before the 151st day. Under § 1121(e), the court has authority to extend the dead-
line only if the debtor demonstrates that the court will confirm a plan. There is no
authority to extend the time on motion of a creditor or a court-appointed trustee.
The court should be allowed substantial discretion to match the statute to the
financial realities of each case.
Hon. Wesley W. Steen, Analysis of Selected Business Bankruptcy Provisions of Senate Bill 625 Prouiding for
Refonn of the Bankruptcy Code, (visited Oct. 27, 1999) <http://www.abiworlLorg/legis/bills/106anal/
99apranalS625.html> (on file with author).
46See S. 625, 106th Cong. § 413 (1999).
47 In the bankruptcy context, there is the American Bankruptcy Institute, National Bankruptcy Con-
ference, the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, the Commercial Law League, and more recently
women's groups, the gun control lobby and others, in addition to the banking and other creditor interests
that participate in the uniform law drafting process.
2000) THE LOCUS OF LAWMAKING
of the legislators, and perhaps substantially less of the electorate. 4s The good
news, and the bad news, is that legislation can go forward in the face of tough
distributive choices.
Horse-Trading. Third, since federal law is self-executing, and a minimum
winning coalition will do, horse-trading among interest groups is easier and
more effective. 49
Volatility. Fourth, because federal law is self-executing, and since horse-
trading is possible, the federal legislative process is likely to be more volatile.
If by virtue of a cobbled-together coalition, that commands a bare majority; a
bill can make its way through Congress and get signed, there's no room for a
rear-guard action of the sort fought by consumer interests with regard to
Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC.
Dialectic Adaptation. Finally, and this softens and is a logical corollary of
the previous points because federal law is self-executing, it can be corrected
(or corrupted) more quickly. There have been significant amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code every four to six years since 1978,50 whereas since 1966,
major revisions to articles of the UCC seem to run on a much slower ten- to
twenty-year schedule.51
4SPublic choice theorists James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock have noted that in a unicameral legisla-
ture where members are elected by a majority of their constituents, a minimum winning coalition (able to
garner 51% of the vote in the legislature) may represent as few as 25% of the electorate (51% of the
members of each district elect 51% of the members of the legislature). To the extent that the two houses
of Congress represent diverse constituencies bicameralism in the federal system may increase the size of
the necessary coalition, but still, legislation may not need the support of a majority of the governed in
order to be enacted. JAMEs BUCHANAN AND GORDtON TULLOCC, THE CALCULUS OF CoNsENT. Looi.
CAL FOUNDATIONS OF A CONSTrrUTIONAL DsmocRAcy 244 (1962) [hereinafter, BUCHANAN AND
TULLOCC, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT]. See also, WLLIAM H. RiKaa, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL
COALITIONS 255 (1962). Cf Saul Levmore, Bicameralism When are Two Decisions Better Than One?. 12
INT'L REv. L. & ECoN. 145 (1992) (Pointing out that bicameralism increases the size of the minimum
winning coalition only when the constituencies of the members of the two houses are diverse, but noting
that bicameralism may limit the danger of cycling majorities).
49Political theorists are divided on the merits of horse-trading. On the one hand, horse-trading may
yield package deals that are good for particular groups but are not necessarily good for everybody. On the
other hand, horse-trading may be efficient because it allows voters to put together packages that take into
account the intensity of legislative preferences. BUCHANAN AND TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CON
SENT, supra note 48 at 144-45. See also, Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice,
103 Yale LJ. 1219, 1279-80 (1994) CThe legislator's ability to reveal intensity of preferences, rather than
mere ordinal ranking of preferences, through strategic voting and logrolling ... allows legislatures, in a
manner that more closely resembles markets than courts, to move toward Pareto optimality."); Gordon
Tullock, Why So Much Stability?, 37 PUB. CHOICE 189-205 (1981).
5
°See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333
(1984); Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (1986); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106
(1994).
"
1The UCC was approved by its sponsors and the ABA in 1952, then revised in 1958, 1962, and
1966. After the initial spate of revisions, however, change has come much more slowly. Article 9 was
revised in 1972, but not again until 1999. Article 8 was revised in 1977, and again in 1994. Article 6 was
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III. THE POLITICS OF BANKRUPTCY REFORM
How are those differences playing out in connection with the Bankruptcy
Reform Act?
A. INTEREST GROUP PARTICIPATION
First, for better or for worse, more interest-group interplay has been obvi-
ous. The influence of the consumer credit industry was apparent from the
beginning, but more recently, other groups have weighed in. Law professors
have taken positions on both sides of the debate over the pending statute.52
Bankruptcy judges, the American Bankruptcy Institute, the National Bank-
ruptcy Conference, and the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges have
weighed in. Women's groups5 3 and consumer groups54 have voiced their
opinion against the statute. Indeed, late in the process, advocates of gun con-
trol and abortion rights managed to propose amendments which had the po-
tential to derail the current bill."
B. GOVERNMENT BY MINIMUM WINNING COALITION
AND HORSE-TRADING
Second, the federal response to interest group activity has been different
from the response by uniform law drafters, at least in part, because of the
ability to horse-trade. In the uniform law process, balanced interest group
revised in 1989. Article 2A was approved in 1987, and substantially amended in 1990. Article 3 was
revised in 1990. See ALI & NCCUSL, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE III (1999). A sixth concern is
that we lose the benefit of anticipated state competition in those situations where such competition would
lead to identification and promulgation of efficient rules.
52Numerous letters in response to the Bankruptcy Reform Act appear on the American Bankruptcy
Institute web site (www.abiworld.org). See, e.g., Nation's Professors Criticize Bankruptcy Bill (visited Jan.
7, 2000) <http://www.abiworld.org/legis/prof crithtml> (on file with author); Letter from Academics
Opposes S. 625 (visited Jan. 7, 2000) <http://www.abiworld.org/legis/bills/106anal/99nov2prof
lett2.html> (on file with author); Profs. Zywicki & White: Letter Supports S. 625 (visited Jan. 7, 2000)
<http://www.abiworld.org/legis/bills/106anal/gmulaw.html> (on file with author).
-
3Letter (dated September 17, 1999) addressed to the U.S. Senate Regarding S. 625 and its Potential
Impact on Women Who File for Bankruptcy Prepared by the National Women's Law Center and the
National Partnership for Women & Families (visited February 24, 2000) <http//www.abiworld.org/
legis/reform/nwlclets625.html> <http-J/wwwabiworld.org/legis/reform/nwlclets625.html> (on file
with author) [hereinafter, Women's Letter].54Letter of the Alliance for Justice, American Association of University Women, American Federation
of State, County and Municipal Employees, Aces, Association for Children for Enforcement of Support,
Inc., Business and Professional Women/USA, Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union,
Center for Law and Social Policy, Ralph Nader, National Consumer Law Center, National Council of
Senior Citizens, National Organization for Women, National Partnership for Women and Families, Na-
tional Women's Law Center, Public Citizen, Unite, UAW-United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricul-
tural Implement Workers of America, U.S. Public Interest Research Group, YWCA of the U.S.A, visited
February 24, 2000 <http://www.abiworld.org/legis/bils/9-22-99cfaletter.html> <httpl/www.abi
worlLorg/legis/bills/9-22-99cfaletter.html> (on file with author) [hereinafter Alliance for Justice Letter].
55See infra notes 73 and 74.
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activity (that is, controversy) has tended to lead to a narrowing of the juris-
dictional scope of the enactment. For example, in the consumer context, the
conflict between the consumer credit industry and consumer advocates led
the drafters to leave the remedies available to the consumer credit industry to
nonuniform state law and to the courts.5 6 By contrast, with regard to the
rule of absolute priority, absence of organized advocacy57 for the interests of
nonadjusting and nonconsensual creditors facilitated, at least in part, the ex-
pansion of Article 9 to cover additional and novel forms of collateral.58 In the
uniform law process, interest group thrust and parry quickly leads to stale-
mate. Group conflict therefore tends to lead to maintenance of the status
quo.59 In the federal process, the dynamic seems to be somewhat different.
A jurisdiction expanding strategy of "quid pro quo" dominates a jurisdiction
narrowing strategy of maintaining the status quo. The strategy appears to be
to hang interest group tinsel on the underlying statutory architecture.
Means testing60 is met with credit card disclosures.61 Credit card nondis-
chargeability62 is met with priority and nondischargeability for support and
nonsupport marital obligations.63
C. VOLATILITY
Thus, and third, the ability to horse-trade appears to contribute to the
volatility of the federal process. The strategy of quid pro quo seems somehow
to be linked to a tendency toward interest group grandstanding. Advocates
of means testing seize on the sound bite of one million bankruptcy filings, the
bankruptcy tax, and the ethic of debtor responsibility.64 Opponents respond
with public criticism of consumer lending practices, and the proposition that
bankruptcy reform is bad for women and children. 65
6See Janger, Article 9 Revision, supra note 10, at 612-14.
7While the "Warren Proposal" was presented to the Drafting Committee, it did not have the backing
of any group that was in a position to make a credible threat to block the statute at the state level. Tort
claimants, who do not yet know who they are, are not well represented in the legislative process. To the
extent that they are represented by ATLA, that group appears to have its hands full trying to block tort
reform.
"
5See Revised U.C.C. § 9.109 (1999) and its comment.
"
9Either because the interest groups agree to maintain the status quo (as in Article 9) or because the
interest groups scuttle the Revision as Article 2.
6°See supra note 44.
6See Sarbanes Amendment No. 1694, submitted to the Senate on Sept. 21, 1999. See also H.R. 1276,
106th Cong. (1999) (Credit Card Consumer Protection Act of 1999).
62See H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. § 142 (1998) (Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, as reported in the
House, on May 18, 1998).
63See H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. §§ 146, 147, 150 (1998).
'See, e.g, Commissioners Edith H. Jones & James I. Shepard, Additional Dissent to Recommendations
for Reform of Consumer Bankruptcy Law at 10-15, in NBRC REPORT, supra note 13, at 1029.
6-See, eg., Alliance for Justice Letter, supra note 54.
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D. DIALECTIC ADAPTATION
Fourth, and this is perhaps the most important difference between the
federal process and the uniform law process, because the federal process can
legislate on the basis of majority, or super-majority coalitions cobbled to-
gether by horse-trading, public controversy can be accommodated as part of
the process. Indeed, the ability to assimilate controversy may encourage such
controversy (in order to generate leverage for a horse-trade). This is both
good and bad. While there are many fundamental changes being wrought in
Revised Article 9 (its scope has been expanded; more things can be "hocked"
more easily; and this is likely to have distributive effects), nobody knows
about it. Not one major newspaper appears to have published an editorial on
Revised Article 9.66 By contrast, whatever the outcome, the progress of
Bankruptcy Reform through Congress has not been private. There have been
multiple editorials and op-editorials in such newspapers as the Washington
Post, New York Times and Wall Street Journal.67 There is a lay understand-
ing of the stakes that is quite unusual for complex legislation about commer-
cial law. Some students this year showed up for class already understanding
that there was something called a "bankruptcy tax," while others showed up
with a sense of outrage about irresponsible extensions of consumer credit.
Needless to say, this is not typical.
The debate over bankruptcy policy, at least consumer bankruptcy policy,
has moved above the fold, and the interest group trade-offs have been made
express. In sum, the issue of "fairness" in bankruptcy is actually being de-
bated, directly in public, and in a backhanded way in Congress. This should,
perhaps, be viewed as an advantage of the federal system, rather than a cost.
Unlike the uniform law process which is hamstrung by public debate, Con-
gress can accommodate it, and it appears to be having a salutary effect on the
legislation, either by blocking it, or by improving it.
E. LONG-TERM DIALECTIC ADAPTATION
This brings me to my final observation about the federal process. I call it
"long-term dialectic adaptation." When evaluating the comparative merits of
legislative processes, there is a strong tendency to take temporal snapshots, to
6A Westlaw search using the terms "Article 9" and "Uniform Commercial Code" or "UCC" located
no articles about Article 9 in the Boston Globe, the Chicago Tribune, the Dallas Morning News, the Los
Angeles Times, the San Francisco Chronicle, the Toronto Globe and Mail, USA Today, the Wall Street
Journal, the Washington Post, NY Times, the Economist, Business Week, Newsweek, or Time Magazine.
67See. e.g., David Frum, Bankruptcy Reform is a Moral Issue, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2000, available in
2000 WL-WSJ 3017572; Jacob M. Schlesinger, House Approves Bankruptcy Bill Amid Criticism Bill May
Be Too Tough, WALL ST. J., May 6,1999, available in 1999 WL-WSJ 5451471; Kathleen Day, Bill Would
Require Warnings on Debt; Amendment Targets Credit-Card Firms. WASH. PosT, Jan. 28,2000, available
in 2000 WL 2282370; Eric Schmitt, Senate Approves a Bill to Toughen Bankruptcy Rules, NY TnAEs,
Feb. 3, 2000, at 1.
(Vol. 74
THE LOCUS OF LAWMAKING
look at the process at one moment in time and to view the current state-of-
the-law reform effort as the sum total of the process not just as a datum. In
this regard, Im lucky that the legislation is not yet in place. This allows me
to take the longer view and suggest that we look not just at this statute, in
draft form, or even the statute that ultimately passes, or is enacted, but in-
stead look at the discussion that started last year as part of an ongoing pro-
cess of our society figuring out who and what we are. As it stands today,
after more than $40,000,000 in lobbying money has been spent,68 no statute
has been enacted.69 A year and a half ago, the Bankruptcy Reform Bill of
1998 looked like a sure thing, passing the Senate by a vote of 97-1,7o but it
was derailed at the last minute by the inability of the House and Senate
Democrats to reach a compromise. 7' Over the last six months, the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Bill has variously looked like a sure thing and a dead duck. As
it steamed toward passage in the fall of 1999, it was stalled by the reluctance
of the bill's managers to bring two amendments to a vote.72 One of these
amendments, proposed by Senator Schumer, would have made claims based
on abortion clinic violence nondischargeable,7 3 and the other, proposed by
6sSee Robert K. Heady, Congress Tries its Hands at Bankruptcy Refor, DAYTON DAILY NEWS,
MA. 8, 1999, at 9. Along with lobbying expenses,
In the last election cycle, according to the Center for Responsive Politics, the mem-
bers of the National Consumer Bankruptcy Coalition, an industry lobbying group
made up of credit card companies such as Visa and Mastercard and associations
representing the nation's big banks and retailers, gave more than $4.5 million in
contributions to parties and candidates. Significant sums came from the same
groups in the form of soft-money contributions to both political parties.
Russ Feingold, Lobbyists Push for Bankruptcy Reform, WASH. POST, June 7, 1999, available in 1999 WL
17007081. A recent Common Cause study places the total of campaign contributions and soft money at
$23.4 million. Common Cause, Bankruptcy Legislation Enters Final Stages; Consumer Credit Industry
Gave $7.5 Million in Campaign Contributions in 1999, According to Common Cause, (visited May 3,
2000) <http://www.commoncause.org/publications/april00/bankruptcy0 l.htm>.
6On February 2, 2000, the Bankruptcy Reform Act passed the Senate, by a vote of 83 to 14. See
Helen Dewar & Kathleen Day, Senate Approves Bankruptcy Bill: Industry-Sought Overhaul Passes 83.14,
WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2000, available in WL 2283515.
7
°See 144 Cong. Rec. S10,767 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1998).71See Charles Jordan Tabb, A Century of Regress or Progress? A Political History of Bankruptcy Legis-
lation in 1898 and 1998, 15 BANKR. DEv. J. 343, 351-53 (1999).
7Unfinfnished Legislative Business, NATIONS CITIES WEEKLY, NOVEMBER 29, 1999, AT P. 6 C(BANK-
RUPTCY REFORM IS SLATED AS THE FIRST ITEM OF BUSINESS WHEN THE SENATE RETURNS NEXT JANU.
ARY. THE BILL, S.625, WAS PULLED FROM THE SENATE FLOOR WHEN TWO CONTROVERSIAL
AMENDMENTS WERE [PROPOSED]. THE FIRST DEALT WITH ABORTION CLINIC VIOLENCE, AND THE SEC-
OND WAS THE [NATIONAL LEAGUE oF CITIES]-SUPPORTED GUN MANUFACTURERS AMENDMENT...
WHICH WOULD HAVE MADE THE DEBTS OF SUCH ENTITIES NON-DISCHARGEABLE IN BANKRUPTCY.").
7Schumer Amendment, No. 2763, submitted to Senate on Nov. 5, 1999. The Schumer Amendment
was ultimately included in the bill which passed the Senate on February 2, 2000. Eric Schmitt, Senate
Approves A Bill to Toughen Bankruptcy Rules, THE NEw YORK TIME.S, Feb. 3, 2000 at p. A6. One wire
service reports the vote as follows:
Until the final vote, it was unclear whether the Schumer Amendment would pass.
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Senator Levin, would have made claims against gun manufacturers based on
handgun violence nondischargeable. 74 Both amendments, it was feared,
would have created difficulties for Republicans otherwise inclined to vote in
favor of the bill. In short, "it's not over until it's over."75
Indeed, and this is what I mean by "Long-Term Dialectic Adaptation,"
even once it's over, it's not over. If it turns out that this statute is too harsh,
or has unsuspected consequences, then the work will not be done. There'll
be another round of amendments and perhaps the pendulum will swing back
The vote count appeared to be so close that the Democratic Leadership called Vice
President Gore yesterday to ask him to revise his campaign schedule and journey to
Washington today to cast a potentially tie-breaking vote. After the Vice Presi-
dent's arrival and a press conference featuring Gore and the amendments support-
ers, including NARAL, Sens. Trent Lott (R-Miss.) and Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)
instructed their majority to vote for the Schumer Amendment, which subsequently
passed by a vote of 80-17.
Senate Backs Effort to Hold Abortion Clinic Violence Perpetrators Accountable, U.S. NawswmE,
Feb. 2, 2000, available on Lexis/Nexis.
74Levin Amendment, No. 2658, submitted to Senate on Nov. 5, 1999. 'The proposal, sponsored by
Sen. Carl M. Levin (D-Mich.), would have barred gun manufacturers from escaping court judgments by
declaring bankruptcy. It was defeated 68 to 29. Several gun manufacturers have declared bankruptcy to
avoid liability resulting from product liability suits" See Dewar & Day, supra note 69. I can't resist
noting, even if only in a footnote, that the Shumer and Levin amendments appear to be a result of strategic
use of cyclical preferences. It is plausible to believe that the proponents of the amendments analyzed the
situation as follows: On the one hand, a majority of Senators would like to enact S.625, and the Republi-
can majority appears to have the votes to do it. On the other hand, a number of Republican Senators are
"pro-choice" or favor gun control. As a result, there may be enough votes to incorporate either, or both of
these amendments. At the same time, many Republicans rely heavily on the support of'pro-life" constitu-
ents or of the NRA, and would oppose a statute that contained either provision. As a result, the following
three inconsistent statements might be true: (1) there is a majority which favors enactment of the statute
without these two amendments; (2) there may also be a majority which favors enactment of the two
amendments; but (3) there is also a majority for maintaining the status quo rather than enacting a statute
containing these two amendments. The preferences of the legislature would therefore be incoherent. If
the amendments come to the floor and were incorporated, the result might be defeat of a statute that
would have passed without inclusion of the amendments. A question which bears more consideration is
whether such cycling is more likely in the federal system than in the uniform state law process, and which
system is better equipped to deal with cyclical preferences when they do arise.
751n this regard, there has been some evolution between the 1998 majority compromise bill (much
harsher than the bill that passed the Senate in 1998) and the 1999 bill. The credit card nondis-
chargeability provisions have been limited in scope, excluding all but purchases on the eve of bankruptcy
to purchase luxury goods. Compare H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. § 142 (1998) (presumption of nondis-
chargeability attaches to 'consumer debts owed to a single creditor incurred by an individual debtor on or
within ninety (90) days before the order for relief"), with H.R. 833, 106th Cong. § 135 (1999) (presump-
tion of nondischargeability attaches to 'consumer debts owed to a single creditor and aggregating more
than $250 for 'luxury goods or services' incurred by an individual debtor" or "cash advances aggregating
more than $250 that are extensions of consumer credit under an open end credit plan obtained by an
individual debtor" when such debt is incurred on or within 90 days before the order for relieo. The means
testing threshold has been raised somewhat. The longer the bill percolates, the more likely it is to moder-
ate. Last year, Professor Tabb pointed out that the Bankruptcy Act of 1896 started out as a creditors'
bill, but over a few years of legislative review changed into something much more balanced. See Tabb,
supra note 71, at 366-81.
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the other way. Moreover, the process of fixing the statute, while cumber-
some, can proceed more quickly in the federal process than in the uniform law
process. As previously observed, the various articles of the UCC are funda-
mentally revised every ten to twenty years, while the Bankruptcy Code has
been amended every four to six years since 1978. Thus, while the volatility
of the federal process is greater, its ability to adapt may be greater as well.
CONCLUSION
While the federal lawmaking process is not pretty, it may be essential.
What we are observing today in connection with Bankruptcy Reform is the
contortion that a society goes through when trying to make a resource alloca-
tion choice that matters. Unlike the uniform law process, and the securitiza-
tion provisions described by Professors Block-Lieb, Carruthers and Halliday
where the discussions have been tidy because they were conducted below
the level of public awareness, this discussion has been open, unpleasant and
messy. So, to answer the question, "Isft democracy awful?" Well, it's the
worst form of government, except for all the others.
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